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Notes and Comments
THE ARBITRATOR, THE COLLECTIVE
AGREEMENT AND THE LAW
By PAUL C. WEILER*
Two recent decisions in the Ontario High Court, quashing labour arbi-
tration awards, have demonstrated the need for a thorough canvass of the
complexities of a new and important issue in labour arbitration. Very generally
stated, the problem is whether, and to what extent, an arbitration board, in
adjudicating a grievance under the collective agreement, may utilize statutes in
reaching its decision.' To the layman this might not appear to be a very difficult
problem. He would naturally assume that laws enacted by the representative
and sovereign legislature would be binding on all citizens of the jurisdiction,
including arbitrators. To the lawyer, though, the issues are much more trouble-
some, because the legal mind is much more concerned with proper procedures
and limited jurisdictions. Almost invariably a collective agreement defines an
arbitrator's jurisdiction in terms of the interpretation and application of the
provisions of the agreement. Most then include a prohibition against the
arbitrator adding to or amending any of the terms of this agreement. Since
utilization of statutory materials appears inconsistent with these typical arbitra-
tion clauses, and since the contract is the source of the arbitrator's authority to
decide the dispute in the first place, the lawyer's concern is understandable.
Before I canvass the dimensions of the problem in detail, I will take a brief
look at the judicial response. In International Chemical Workers Union v.
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
1Though I have not found previous discussions of this issue in the literature of
Canadian labour law, there are several good contributions in recent American publications.
I have relied especially on the publication of meetings of the National Association of
Arbitrators. See Meltzer, "Ruminations about Ideology, Law, and Labour Arbitration",
from The Arbitrator, the N.L.R.B., and the Courts, (1967 - 20th Annual Meeting) 1, at
14-19; with comments at 27-36; Mittenthal, "The Role of Law in Arbitration", with
rejoinders from Meltzer, Howlett and St. Antoine, from Developments in American and
Foreign Arbitration (1968 - 21st Annual Meeting) at 42; and Sovern, "When Should
Arbitrators Follow Federal Law", from Arbitrators and the Expanding Role of Neutrals
(1970 - 23rd Annual Meeting) 29. Recent discussions of special areas of statute law and
arbitration include Gould, Labour Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimi-
nation (1969), 24 Arbitration Journal 197; McKelvey, Sex and the Single Arbitrator (1970-
71), 24 Industrial and Labour Relations Review 335. I will indicate the positions taken
by these various writers later on, where appropriate to the text.
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Krever et al,2 a grievance had been brought by the Union against Consumers'
Gas for having a supervisor do work normally performed by bargaining unit
employees, in breach of an explicit term of the agreement. The arbitrator,
however, denied the grievance on the grounds that the supervisor in question
was the only person who was qualified to perform this work, under safety regu-
lations issued by the Atomic Energy Control Act. The Court quashed the award
on the ground that the decision was in conflict with the terms of the agreement,
and the Board was not justified in using the regulations to justify such an altera-
tion of these terms. Mr. Justice Stark does say that "the Board is strictly limited
to interpreting the written contract", and thus seems to speak directly to our
problem. However, it is also apparent that his conclusion in the circumstances
of this case was affected by the fact the Company had deliberately placed itself
in the position of having to choose between the agreement and the legislation,
when it promoted the supervisor out of the bargaining unit.
No such restrictive interpretation can be placed on the decision in a more
recent case. In R.C.A. Victor Ltd. v. I.W.A., 3 the collective agreement provided
for limited major medical insurance at the expense of the Company. However,
this insurance agreement was rendered null and void by Section 25 of the Health
Services Insurance Act of 1969, which provided for compulsory medical insur-
ance through O.H.S.I.P. Section 10(2) of the Act provided that:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect any agreement or arrangement for
contribution by an employer of all or any of the premiums payable for insurance in
respect of his employees and any obligation of the employer thereunder to pay all or
any part of the premium for insured health services continues in respect of the
payment of the premium for insured health services under this Act.
The Union lodged a grievance which claimed that the Company should pay
for all the premiums of O.H.S.I.P., the latter being a more comprehensive and
more expensive scheme. A difficult question of statutory interpretation was
raised in the case but the arbitrator concluded this issue in the Union's favour
and upheld the grievance. 4 Mr. Justice Grant in the High Court quashed the
2 (1968), 68 C.L.L.C. 14,086 (Ont. H.C.).
3 (1971), 71 C.L.L.C. 14,099 (Ont. H.C.).
41 was also faced with the same problem as arbitrator of a different agreement of
R.C.A. Victor with another union at a different plant, though with the same language. My
decision followed the arbitration award in the case referred to in the text but preceded the
quashing of that award. Suffice it to say that, in my opinion, I held that I had jurisdiction
as an arbitrator to consider what I took to be a statutory amendment of a term of the
collective agreement in the course of interpreting and applying the agreement itself.
However, I interpreted the statutory amendment in accordance with the Company
argument, and the conclusion of Mr. Justice Stark. The jurisdictional issue is complicated
by the fact that Section 10(3), which created a new union right to the excess of any
premiums following the changeover to OHSIP, specifically provided for arbitration under
Section 10(3) and inferentially excluded it under Section 10(2). This view of statutory inter-
pretation does not seem to me to do justice to the reasonable expectations of the legislature.
The obligation to pay premiums for the old private scheme was enforceable in arbitration.
The legislature has provided for the use of arbitration to enforce the new obligation in
respect of the excess of premiums under OHSIP. What possible reason could it have for
excluding the use of arbitration to enforce the continued basic obligation to pay the
premiums for the new insurance scheme of OHSIP? In interpreting statutes or collective
agreements, I have always found it a very helpful step in assessing the contentions of either
side to ask the simple question - "Now why would the legislature (or the parties) have
wanted that result?" If this question were asked in the R.C.A. Victor situation, the conclu-
sion as to the jurisdictional issue is, with all due respect, obvious.
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award on two grounds, one relating to the interpretation of the statute but the
first, and more important for our purposes, being that the arbitration board had
no power to base its decision on the statute rather than the agreement. Key
passages in his opinion which indicate the gist of his reasoning read as follows:5
All subsections of section 10 do impose obligations on the employer, who has
contracted with employees to provide them with some form of health insurance. The
section deals with the extent of such continued obligation during the balance of the
term of the agreement or until a new agreement in respect thereof has been
negotiated between the parties. In our present case, the rights and obligations of the
parties, however, in that interval arise by virtue of the statute rather than by the
agreement It would be otherwise if the parties by their agreement had specifically
contracted as to their respective rights and obligations when OHSIP should become
effective.
A board of arbitration derives its authority from and is limited by the terms of the
collective agreement. Its jurisdiction is solely to determine questions arising with
respect to the application, administration or alleged violation of the collective
agreement. The board was limited in its consideration of this grievance to the
question as to whether or not the collective agreement, as opposed to the statute,
imposed an obligation on the part of the company to pay all the additional OHSIP
premiums when the same should come into effect on October 1st, 1969.
The majority award is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the board by reason of
the fact it has based its decision on an interpretation of the statute rather than on the
collective agreement.
These are the two judicial decisions reported in recent Canadian law which
focus directly on this problem. (Of course, there is a great deal of general
language in other decisions about the limited contractual character of an arbi-
trator's jurisdiction. However, the cases either do not deal with a statutory basis
for the alleged "amendment" of the agreement 6 or, if they do, the statute is
interpreted as inapplicable in any event.7 ) As far as the two relevant cases are
concerned, whatever may be said about the rightness or wrongness of the
particular decisions, the reasoning in each displays the deficiency which is
endemic across the whole spectrum of judicial review of administrative deci-
5 Id. at 14,524-25.
6 In Port Arthur Shipbuilding v. Arthurs, [1969] S.C.R. 85 at 95-96, the Supreme
Court of Canada said:
An arbitration board of the type under consideration has no inherent powers of
review similar to those of the Courts. Its only powers are those conferred upon it
by the collective agreement and these are usually defined in more detail. It has no
inherent powers to amend, modify, or ignore the collective agreement. But this is
exactly what this board did in this case and it was clearly in error in so doing, and
its award should be quashed.
Though this passage was relied on by the court in R.C.A. Victor Ltd., it dealt with
the power of an arbitrator to "imply" additional remedial powers as part of a common law
of labour arbitration, not with his right (or duty) to apply mandatory statutory provisions
in administering the agreement.
7 Two other recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions, Union Carbide v. Weiler
(1968), 70 D.L.R. (2d) 333 and General Truck Drivers Union Local 938 v. Hoar Transport
(1969), 4 D.L.R. (3d) 449, dealt with a situation where an arbitrator (this writer) utilized a
statute as the basis for giving relief to the application of procedural penalty clauses in the
agreement. The decision of the Court, as I read it, is based on the conclusion that the
statute did not apply, and is not authority against using statutes if they are interpreted as
applying.
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sions.8 The nature of this deficiency is nicely captured by the phrase "absentee
management". The courts see only a very few of the "trouble cases" which may
appear among the many decided by those with primary responsibility in the
area (and any one judge is involved in only a fraction of those which do get to
court). As a result, the judge is directly confronted with only an isolated slice of
what is usually a complicated legal situation. Moreover, the limitations of the
adversary process do not permit ready education of the judges in the many
facets of the legal area as a whole. Even if the administrative decisions are
reported (as are the labour arbitration cases, for instance), it is almost unheard
for judges to read or utilize them directly.
Yet the courts "hold the trumps" because of their superior position in the
hierarchy of legal authority. They can insert new, abstract, and authoritative
legal doctrines into the on-going process of administrative decisions, which can
wreak great damage to the coherence of this order, especially when read literally
and out of context. Despite these evident dangers, the belief in the desirability
of judicial review remains dominant in our legal ideology and its incidence is
rapidly increasing in labour arbitration. I believe the only way to preserve the
virtues and minimize the harms from judicial supervision of specialized tri-
bunals is to initiate scholarly discussion of problem areas in substantive
administrative law and policy, as they are seen from inside the process. These
must canvass all the issues in the area, showing both the relationships and
differences between them, and articulating the reasons why the law should lean
one way rather than another. If these are used both by lawyers and by the
courts, it will be possible to develop a more informed, and perhaps more sympa-
thetic, exercise of judicial review. It is to this end that this comment is directed.
There are several different contractual situations in which a statutory rule
may be relevant. The first occurs where there is very general or vague language
in a contractual provision and the statute is sought to be used as an aid in inter-
pretation of the agreement. For example, the agreement may speak in general
terms of rights accruing to an "employee". Can an arbitrator look to the Labour
Relations Act for help in defining the status of a person on a legal strike, for
example?9 An agreement provides that there is to be no discipline without "just
cause". Can an arbitrator, faced with discipline for insubordination in refusing
to obey a work order, look to a statute (e.g., the Atomic Energy Control Act)
8 1 have analyzed this defect in judicial review in greater detail in a recent article
about the Supreme Court of Canada and labour law. See Weiler, The 'Slippery Slope' of
Judicial Intervention (1971), 9 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1.
9 In Falconbridge Nickel Mines (1971) unreported (Weiler), I utilized the Section 1(2)
definition in the Labour Relations Act of the status of an employee on strike as an aid in
interpreting the significance of time on strike in calculating the service which determined
the length of vacation to which an employee was entitled under the agreement. This
decision was recently upheld on a certiorari motion in the High Court. The arbitrator in
Canada Bread Co. (1970), 22 L.A.C. 98 (Christie), used various provisions in the Labour
Relations Act in defining the ambit of the "collective agreement" which he was to apply.
Similarly, the problem of determining length of seniority where corporate ownership of a
plant changes but the agreement is continued would be helped by a consideration of Section
7 of the Employment Standards Act, which provides for continuity of employment upon
transfer of a business (a factor which was missed in the decision in Reinforcing Steel (1970)
unreported (Weiler)). I would add at this point that the arbitration cases which I am going
to cite are primarily my own, because I am using them mainly as illustrative of different
problem-situations. I have not systematically canvassed all the arbitration decisions to try
to establish any arbitral concensus as to the issues.
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in determining whether the work ordered was unsafe? 10 An agreement provides
for seniority rights to jobs where there is sufficient "ability". Can an arbitrator
look to statutes prohibiting discrimination against women to hold that general
company rules against women holding some jobs are invalid?"
The very general and sweeping language of Mr. Justice Grant, while
admittedly directed to another problem, does appear to throw doubt on the
legitimacy of the reference to statutes in any of these situations, and I have had
counsel argue against their use on such a basis. However, I think there can be
no doubt that such a source for arbitral reasoning both should be, and will be,
held legitimate. The arbitrator is enforcing an obligation imposed by the agree-
ment, and is only using the statute as an aid in discovering or crystallizing the
meaning of the agreement. The language of the agreement on its face does not
give the answer and arbitration boards may and do use their own common
sense, other arbitration precedents, or common law decisions to elaborate the
meaning of the contract. Surely, the policies and standards developed by the
legislature should be of even more significant weight in this process. The parties
should be assumed to want their agreement interpreted, if possible, in line with
contemporary law (even if this requires over-riding earlier common law or
arbitral presumptions' 2 ).
10 For example, would the decision in the Krever case, supra, note 2, have been the
same if a bargaining unit employee had been ordered to do the work, declined to do so
because he believed it unsafe without qualifications or experience, and been suspended for
insubordination. In determining whether this discipline was for "just cause", could an
arbitrator look at the statutory safety regulations? In a recent case, Int'l Woodworkers of
America Local 1-71 v. Weldwood (1970), 74 W.W.R. 568 (B.C.C.A.), the Court of Appeal
looked at a safety provision in a statute to find the employees' conduct to be unsafe and
negligent, and thus open to discipline. On the other hand, the propriety of an arbitrator
looking at a statute for this purpose was seriously doubted in Re Pulp, Sulphite and Paper
Mill Workers and Domtar Pulp and Paper (1966), 16 L.A.C. 408 (Lane), and apparently,
in Ontario Steel Products (1972), 23 L.A.C. 386 (Hinnegan).11 In Re ICW Local 186 and Continental Can (1970), 21 L.A.C. 361 (Palmer), the
arbitrator referred, though in a subsidiary way, to the legislative policy of the province to
find such a company practice to be invalid under the general language of the Agreement.
12 It is in this latter situation that the use of statutory materials is likely to be most
significant. Earlier arbitration precedents may have established presumptions in applying
general language in the agreement, and the latter statute may make this presumption illegal.
Resort to the statute may be the necessary basis for the legal justification of ignoring a series
of precedents which constituted a consensus among arbitrators. For example, many earlier
decisions had held overtime to be compulsory in the absence of contrary language in the
Agreement. Sections 14 and 18 of the Employment Standards Act make overtime illegal
after 8 hours in the day and 48 hours in the week. These sections were relied on in Lake
Ontario Steel (1968) unreported (Johnston) and Lake Ontario Steel (1968) unreported
(Weiler), to hold that employees could not be compelled to work overtime, or disciplined
for refusal, in breach of the statute (and where one of the exempting provisions in the
statute did not apply). Neither of these cases involved an agreement with explicit language
making all overtime compulsory (as was held to be the case in Re Int'l Union of Electrical
Workers, Local 566 and J.A. Wilson Display (1968), 19 L.A.C. 352 (Johnston)), and in Gall
Metals (1971), 3 L.A.C. 33 (Egan). Since writing this piece, I have reviewed the relation of
the Employment Standards Act as to overtime under the collective agreement in the as yet
unreported decision in Grace Cryovac (1972; Weiler). A similar problem would be faced in
cases of discipline for garnishee orders which was apparently justified under earlier arbitra-
tion decisions (the cases are reviewed in Re Lumber and Sawmill Workers' Union Local
2537 and K.V.P. Co. Ltd. (1965), 16 L.A.C. 73 (Robinson)), but is now illegal under
Section 5 of the Employment Standards Act: "No employer shall dismiss or suspend an
employee upon the ground that garnishment proceedings are or may be taken against that
employee."
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I have referred to, though not discussed in detail, the problem of the use of
statutes as an aid in interpreting the collective agreement, even though I do not
believe there is much doubt about its legitimacy and the two decisions men-
tioned earlier do not focus on its legality. However, it is vital that we distinguish
these cases from those that do raise real issues about the limits of an arbitrator's
jurisdiction in order that our answer to the latter not unwittingly produce an
undesirable rule for the former. The difficult cases, where there is a real conflict
of important interests, occur where the statutory rule is inconsistent with the
provision of the collective agreement, or any fair interpretation of the latter.
This becomes a problem when the statute mandatorily limits and over-rides the
exercise of a contractual freedom, and is not just a supplementary aid in the
interpretation of the open or "unwritten" area of the agreement. Is it legitimate
for an arbitrator to take account of this legislative purpose in the performance
of his task of administering the collective agreement?
A further basic distinction must be made even within this category. Some-
times, the objectives of the statute may be negative - the prohibition of certain
kinds of contractual terms - and the arbitrator will satisfy them by simply
holding the offending contract term to be void for illegality. For example, the
contract may provide for compulsory overtime in breach of the Employment
Standards Act, or employer reimbursement of the last 10% of doctor's bills in
breach of the O.H.S.I.P. Act, or sex as a criterion for promotion, or pregnancy
as an automatic reason for discharge. If this clause is deemed null and void, it
is simply treated as excised from the collective agreement and the rights and
duties of the parties in arbitration can be determined by the application of the
other terms of the agreement. Refusal to work overtime, or being pregnant,
is evaluated under the "just cause" provision, seniority by reference to "ability"
in the individual case, and the employer is not obligated to pay any "insurance"
for the remaining 10% of unpaid medical bills.13 This procedure is legally
defensible, I believe, as an application of a contract doctrine of "illegality",
which is as much a part of the background of contract law as the "parole
evidence" rule. It leaves the arbitrator positively enforcing only those obliga-
tions which actually flow from the contract.
The other, and much more difficult situation, occurs where the statute itself
is intended to place a positive obligation on one of the parties to the agree-
ment. 14 The Employment Standards Act may require payment of minimum
13 A recent example of the latter situation is Bendix-Eclipse v. U.A.W. (1971),
71 C.L.L.C. 14,089 (Ont. H.C.), where the arbitrator interpreted the agreement as requiring
the employer to pay some of the extra doctor's fees unpaid by O.H.S.I.P., and the court
quashed the award as requiring private medical "insurance" which was illegal under
Section 25(1) of The Health Services Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1970 c. 200. Presumably the
recent decision of the Arbitration Board in Board of Education of Etobicoke (1972)
unreported (Vinnegan) may receive the same treatment.
14There are some positive obligations imposed on the parties, or directions given to
the arbitrator, under The Ontario Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1970 c. 232 which appear
to give him explicit powers to apply even in the face of contrary language in the agreement.
See Section 36(1) dealing with the no-strike clause, Section 37(1) and (2) dealing with the
arbitration clause, Section 37(7a) dealing with the equitable jurisdiction of the arbitrator
in discipline cases and Section 70 dealing with the statutory extension of the agreement
during conciliation. Interesting questions have been and can be raised about the compati-
bility of certain qualifications in the agreement and the scope of these mandatory terms of
the agreement, and the question might arise as to the arbitrator's power to follow the
statute in face of the agreement. (See the discussion in Royal Canadian Mint (1972), 23
L.A.C, 365 (Abbott).
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wages, or vacations, or overtime pay.15 The Health Services Insurance Act
requires substitution of O.H.S.I.P. for P.S.I. and other private plans. It is not
enough simply to invalidate the offending wage, vacation pay, or health insur-
ance provisions in order to attain the statutory objectives because this will not
provide the employee with the positive benefits he is supposed to receive. Yet
the situation might appear to be qualitatively different in legal or jurisdictional
terms because the arbitrator is now positively implementing obligations created
by statute and not by contract. I have no doubt that reviewing courts will find
this a much more difficult arbitral innovation to swallow. Still, though, the
dimensions of the problem are basically the same - do we feel arbitrators are
competent to interpret statutes and do we want them to use these statutes to
rewrite part of a collective agreement, the whole of which has been negotiated
through compromises by each of the parties? Neither of these factors is altered
if we conceive of the statute, or the arbitrator's use of it, in essentially negative
or positive terms. 16  * * . . *
What should be the legal response to this jurisdictional problem? There
are plausible arguments which can be made for either side and I will begin by
making the case for arbitral jurisdiction first. The labour relations policy in
Ontario, expressed both in the statute17 and in decisions of the Labour Relations
Board,'8 favours the channelling of contractual disputes between parties to a
collective agreement into grievance arbitration. The parties are both familiar
with and comfortable in this procedure. Prima facie, it makes sense to channel
disputes about statutory amendments into the same institution, rather than
utilizing another tribunal or the courts. The arguments of cost, speed, and
informality which justify arbitration generally are equally applicable here. 19
In fact, they are even more significant in this context because the alternative is
almost certainly going to be duplication of litigation in different forums. If the
arbitrator cannot utilize the statute to hold a contractual provision illegal, and
he applies the latter according to its terms, the result will be that the award will
have to be taken to court every time in order to consider the relevance and effect
of a statute.20 If an arbitrator cannot apply the statute positively, as a source of
15 In Sargent Hardware (1971) unreported (Weiler), I was faced with a claim by a
female employee for equal pay for equal work under Part 6 of the Employment Standards
Act. The Union argued that separate male and female seniority lists under the agreement
did not reflect differences in the work actually performed, and thus differential rates of pay
were in breach of this Part of the Act which prohibited such discrimination based on sex.
In fact, the seniority lists did reflect differences in jobs and thus my decision was that
the grievance was invalid and the real statutory claim was one relating to discrimination in
promotion. However, if I had found the factual basis of the Union claim to be established,
it would not have been enough, for the grievor's purposes, to simply hold negatively that
the offending provisions were illegal and thus void. The grievor's claim required a positive
right under some term defining the wages to be paid and a very nice question would arise
as to whether they should be the lower female or the higher male rates. Discrimination
could be eliminated by discarding either the male rate or the female rate or by averaging
the two. The choice as to any one of these requires a positive definition by the adjudicator
of the new obligation of the employer. Finally, I must note that the evidence at the hearing
disclosed that the Union was told by the Department of Labour to take the case to
arbitration, rather than under the statutory procedures. The fact that the government
administration believed this to be a desirable policy, and my discovery in the case of the
jurisdictional roadblocks to it, triggered my own interest in this enquiry.
16 Two of the writers mentioned in note 1 above have drawn a somewhat different,
though related, distinction. Mittenthal, at pp. 47 ff., says that "although the arbitrator's
award may permit conduct forbidden by law but sanctioned by contract, it should not
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require conduct forbidden by law even if sanctioned by contract." Sovern, at pp. 38 ff.,
agrees with the substance of this distinction, though with certain further qualifications on
the use of statutes even in the latter case. The implications of this approach can be gathered
from a simple example of a seniority clause which conflicts with an Act to prevent
Discrimination in Employment because of Sex or Marital Status. If the employer chooses
to follow the Act, and thus is in breach of the agreement, and an employee who is entitled
under the agreement grieves, the arbitrator will utilize the statute so as not to order illegal
action by the employer. On the other hand, if the employer chooses to follow the agreement,
and thus is in breach of the Act, and an employee who is entitled under the Act grieves, the
arbitrator will refuse to utilize the statute and thus will permit illegal action by the
employer, leaving sanctions for the latter to appropriate governmental action. Since the
effect of this procedure is to leave discretion with the immediate decision-maker to respect
the statute or agreement as he chooses, and the employer almost always has this initial
discretion, the adoption of this approach merely extends the ambit of management
discretion. A compelling answer to the suggestion was made, I believe, by Meltzer, at p. 60:
Whatever one's view of the larger issue as to the role of law in arbitration, I cannot
see an acceptable basis for Mr. Mittenthal's formula. It is not supported by the
authority conferred on the arbitrator by the parties; or by the expertise imputed to
arbitrators and courts; or by the twin desires for finality of arbitration awards and
the limitation of judicial intervention. Under Mr. Mittenthal's approach, the role
accorded to law would depend on how an employer resolved a controversy and not
on its essential character or the functions properly delegated to different adjudicative
agencies. In my opinion, such an approach transforms an accidental consideration
into a decisive one. His formula, incidentally, also appears to run contrary to Cox's
suggestion, on which he relies; for Cox admonished the arbitrator to "look to see
whether sustaining the grievance would require conduct the law forbids or would
enforce an illegal contract; if so, the arbitrator should not sustain the grievance".
In my opinion, if the arbitrator is viewed as "enforcing" contracts, he "enforces" an
illegal contract equally whether he causes an employer to engage in an act
prohibited by statute or, by denying a remedy, condones the prohibited act already
executed by the employer.
Meltzer, by contrast, forthrightly takes the view that "where there is an irrepressible
conflict, the arbitrator, in my opinion, should respect the agreement and ignore the law....
The basis for this approach is, of course, that the parties typically call on an arbitrator to
construe and not to destroy their agreement". (at p. 16). Howlett, on the other hand,
argues that the statute should always be decisive, in both negative and positive terms,
because the wishes of the legislature are paramount to those of the parties.
17 See Section 34(1) of The Ontario Labour Relations Act.
18 E.g., Vera Elkington and Wallace Barnes (1961), 61 C.L.L.C. 928 (O.L.R.B.); United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America and National Showcase Ltd. (1961), 61
C.L.L.C. 901 (O.L.R.B.); Franz Kuntz and Pitt Street Hotel Ltd. (1963), 63 C.L.L.C. 1148
(O.L.R.B.); compare Boivin (1966) O.L.R.B. Oct. Mthly. Rep. 513.
19 See Weiler, The Role of the Labour Arbitrator: Alternative Versions (1969), 19
University of Toronto Law Journal 16 at 29-30.
20 This is what happens in the kind of situation occurring in Bendix-Eclipse, discussed
at footnote 13 above. If the arbitrator can not only interpret the agreement but also can
determine if this interpretation is illegal, and then act accordingly, he may decide the case
finally at that stage. Of course, sometimes the interpretation of the statute in arbitration
will be disputed and taken to court, but this will occur only in some fraction of the total
number of cases. If he ignores the statute in every case, then the party who wants it applied
will have to go to court every time that the other party will not concede its application.
Meltzer, at p. 62, suggested that "once the arbitrator has done the job of interpreting the
agreement, responsible parties will presumably obey the clear mandate of the law without
recourse to the courts." In fact, I think that the party who has claimed his contractual
rights successfully through arbitration and resisted the statute up to that time, is not likely
to concede very often before judicial review. In fact, it is the party who has lost in
arbitration in terms of a pure interpretation of the agreement, but who has a good case in
terms of the statute, who is more likely to concede the case rather than go to the trouble
and expense of trying to get the award quashed in court. Arbitral restraint in ignoring the
statute may thus serve only to entrench the illegality and injustice in the operation of a
contract term which the legislature has defined as against public policy.
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obligation on the parties, then any time the statute also requires interpretation
of the contract, sequential litigation in arbitration and in court will be necessary
in order to obtain final relief.21 Even in cases where the rights under the agree-
ment and under the statute may be logically distinguishable, they may not be
severable as a practical matter. An employee may claim that his discharge22 or
denial of -a promotion23 was unjustified and arguments are advanced by either
side, some related to a statute and others not. One cannot anticipate how these
arguments will turn out on the facts until all of the evidence is in and they are
evaluated, and, in any event, they may be cumulatively intermeshed in evalu-
ating the employer decision. A more efficient solution is to allow all of these
factors to be assessed in arbitration, with subsequent review available else-
where24 (if this is believed necessary by either party or by the administrative
2 1 A good example of this is the R.C.A. Victor case, discussed at footnote 2 above.
The Court there held that the statute could not be interpreted and applied in arbitration.
However, it appears from the Rights of Labour Act and certain appellate decisions, that
the collective agreement cannot be interpreted and applied in court (see Close v. Globe &
Mail (1967), 60 D.L.R. (2d) 105 (Ont. C.A.)). Yet the ultimate conclusion as to employee
rights to employer contribution to OHSIP appears to depend on an interpretation and
application of both statute and agreement. The only way to avoid a jurisdictional "no-man's
land" is to allow sequential litigation, where an interpretation of the earlier agreement is
secured in arbitration and this is taken to court for interpretation and enforcement of the
statutory change in the agreement is secured. The delay, cost, and awkwardness of this
procedural situation is obvious.22 In Canada-Ferro (1971), unreported (Weiler), I was confronted with a case of a
woman who was discharged for excessive absenteeism. Some of this absence was due to a
series of pregnancies with complications but some was not so' related, and the employer's
decision was based on the total record. Section 9 of the Act to prevent Discrimination in
Employment because of Sex or Marital Status was relevant to the pregnancy-related leaves
of absence but not to the other. Hence, proceedings under the Act could deal only with one
part of the problem while a restrictive view of the arbitrator's jurisdiction would allow him
to deal only with the other part. In reality, though, the two segments of the problem could
not be distinguished.
23The problem faced by the arbitrator in Continental Can, supra note 11, where
seniority was denied because of sex, would be similarly complicated if other factors were
also relied on by the employer.
24The legality of the award under the statute could obviously be reviewed in court on
an application for certiorari for error of law on the face of the record. However, the Court
would have to be careful in utilizing its ordinary principles of judicial review for this new
situation. Typically, review is sought for an error in the interpretation of the language of
the contract, and the Court will quash the award only on the grounds that the interpretation
is one that the contract language cannot reasonably bear. This can easily be justified on the
theory that disagreements about the merits of a contract interpretation do not necessarily
rise to the level of an error of law, since so much of the meaning of the contract depends
on its individual background and context. (A good example of this standard in operation is
Riverdale Hospital v. Higgins, Mayo, & C.U.P.E. (1971), 71 C.L.L.C. 14,097 (Ont. C.A.).)
However, when the question is whether the arbtrator's interpretation of the statute is to be
sustained, I would submit that the test is not simply whether his conclusion is reasonable,
but whether it is correct (in the opinion of the Court). A court should not adopt the same
attitude as it does to arbitral interpretation of contracts and hold that one meaning of the
statute can reasonably be imputed in the context of one collective ageement and another
meaning be accepted as reasonable under another collective agreement. A case where the
Ontario Court of Appeal failed to appreciate the demands of judicial supervision of this
new form of arbitral interpretation is Ford Motor Co. v. U.A.W. (1971), 71 C.L.L.C.
14,088 (Ont.C.A.).
I should add that the department of the government responsible for administration
of the statute could also institute its own procedures under the Act if unsatisfied with its
treatment in arbitration. Of course, at this second stage, care would have to be taken to
prevent double jeopardy to the offending party or double recovery to the complainant.
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agency). In fact, as I learned in the context of the Sargent Hardware case, this
is the policy of at least some governmental administrators of the legislation.
There are several arguments which are made to rebut this prima facie case.
The first, which is especially popular in the United States, is that arbitration is
based on consent of the parties, and the latter have not contracted to allow the
arbitrator this jurisdiction. s In Ontario, in any event, this argument appears to
me to be misconceived. Arbitration is compulsory by statute irrespective of the
wishes of the parties. The provisions of the statute are compulsory and the
decision of the parties to evade them is illegal. It is perfectly legitimate to infer
that the arbitrator is himself bound by the statute26 in adjudicating disputes,
again irrespective of the agreement of the parties to the contrary. No one of the
facets of this problem depends on consent and this appears to be the weakest
argument against an extension of the arbitrator's jurisdiction.
Another important argument against the arbitrator's jurisdiction, related
to but subtly different from that of consent, is concerned with the value of the
acceptability of arbitration.27 This is one of the very important reasons for the
very existence of grievance arbitration as a mode of dispute-settlement, because
each side can select a decision-maker in whom it has confidence, while bias is
minimized because each side has a similar "say". However, this acceptability is
engendered in a context where the arbitrator is interpreting and applying a legal
regime created and agreed-to by the parties who bear the consequences of his
decision. To require arbitration to use an alien legal regime, imposed on the
parties against their wishes, may harm their confidence in the long-range value
of the process as an instrument of self-government. This is particularly the case
where the two parties have negotiated an agreement which turns out to be
partially illegal. Although both sides have made compromises to achieve this
agreement, one now utilizes arbitration to get some parts of the bargain over-
25 This is the thrust of Meltzer's position, and is ably supported by St. Antoine, in the
references in footnote 1 above. St. Antoine says, at p. 77, "Arbitrators do not, strictly
speaking, enforce contracts; courts enforce contracts. The arbitrator is simply the 'official
reader' designated by the parties to provide definitive interpretations of their agreement....
An arbitrator is the creature of the contract. It is the source and limit of his authority, and
he has no licence to look beyond its borders for some external standard by which to nullify
or restrict its operation." Mittenthal seconds this, at p. 58: "Statutory law may guide the
arbitrator on occasion. But the arbitrator must follow the rule of law established by the
contract. He is part of a private process for the adjudication of private rights and duties.
He should not be asked to assume public responsibilities and to do the work of public
agencies. He has no general charter to administer justice for a community which transcends
the parties." Even in the United States, Sovern takes what I believe to be a more realistic
approach which holds that it is the demands of the national labour law policy, not the
agreement of the parties, which must be decisive with respect to this issue. He says that the
"critical question is whether it is a desirable method of coordinating a private system of
adjudication with a governmentally-imposed legal and administrative framework."
26 The provisions of the Act prohibiting discrimination on account of sex prohibit
"persons" establishing or maintaining employment classifications or lines of progression
which differentiate by sex. Can it not be said that an arbitrator is a person who maintains
such an illegal classification when he applies and enforces it in adjudicating a claim in
arbitration?
271 have developed in more detail the significance of this characteristic of arbitration
in Weiler, Labour Arbitration and Industrial Change (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970)
67-68.
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turned in his favour. 28 Unfortunately, there is another dimension to the problem
caused by this issue for the confidence of the parties in arbitration. It may be
that a lawyer can appreciate the subtle reasons why an arbitrator should ignore
the clear demands of a statutory requirement but, in my experience, the layman
on either the employer or the union side cannot and does not. It is at least as
likely that the acceptability of arbitration will be eroded in this direction as in
the other.
It seems that the most compelling concern is that of arbitral competence. 29
Arbitrators are specialists in, and eventually become expert at, interpreting and
administering the language of collective agreements. This is not true of their
capacities with respect to the language of statutes and the same may well be the
case with the counsel who must provide arguments for their decision. On
balance, though, I do not believe this is a valid argument for total exclusion
of statutes from arbitration. In the first place, it is inconsistent with the require-
ment and the fact that law is constantly being used in interpretation within
arbitration. It is common to see reference in opinions to contract law, labour
law, criminal law, or evidence law, involving both statutes and cases. Similarly,
as I stated earlier, the "mandatory" provisions in question here should be used
in interpreting vague contract language. If arbitrators are competent to interpret
statutes to elaborate the agreement, they should be equally competent to
interpret statutes to over-ride the agreement.30 Secondly, I do not believe that
construction of statutes is so very different from construction of collective
agreements, or that arbitrators are less competent than alternative adjudicators
to utilize statutory materials. The kinds of people who do arbitrate in Ontario
are almost all lawyers, whether judges, prosecutors, labour board members,
labour law teachers, etc., and they are not strangers to this kind of legislation.
Thirdly, this argument for exclusion of these materials is strangely self-fulfilling.
281 would note the trend in recent legislation in Ontario to utilize the existing labour
arbitration process to impose solutions to labour relations problems on parties who have
not agreed to them. Examples include interest-dispute arbitration in hospitals, police, etc.,
and arbitration of damage claims for illegal strikes and lockouts outside a collective
agreement. (See Section 68a of Labour Relations Act.)29 This argument is particularly relied on by Meltzer in his comments in both panel
discussions referred to in footnote 1 in which he participated. He gives an example of a
case where an arbitrator may well have erred in interpreting a statute and holding it
invalidated an agreement and suggests that this possibility is a good reason for arbitrators
not exercising any jurisdiction at all to apply statutory law in conflict with the agreement.
30This point is made by Sovern, in the article cited in note 1 above, at 34. His
article goes on to deal with the relevance of this problem of the sophisticated doctrines in
American law of "primary jurisdiction." The common sense which underlies these doctrines
is based on the assumption that the legislature must have had very good reasons for
centralizing enforcement of a new statute within the confines of a specialized and expert
administrative agency. To the extent that unsupervised and ad hoc arbitration boards take
on themselves the task of interpreting the statute, a very incoherent and often distorted
administration of the law is likely to develop. However, there are two reasons why these
dangers are simply not applicable in Canada. In the first place, judicial review of the inter-
pretation of the legislation by arbitrators results in centralized supervision in the appellate
courts (see note 24 above). Secondly, the statutes we are talking about almost invariably
create a system of decentralized adjudication at the primary level. The devices adopted are
ad hoc boards of inquiry (often composed of the same people who act as arbitrators) and/or
enforcement procedures before a provincial court judge. Whatever controls there are to
this system of adjudication come from the same appellate courts who are available to
review arbitral interpretations of this same statute.
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If arbitrators do not advert to, and consider statutes consistently, then they will
not likely be expert. However, if they can and do use this source of law, they
will become experienced in the task.
The argument of incompetence, to the extent that it is valid, is really one
of caution. In cases of doubt, the decision should be in favour of legality of the
contract, but if illegality appears clear, arbitrators should not be afraid to rely
on their judgment. It is true that arbitrators may err in interpreting statutory
law but then judicial review is available for correcting those errors, which will
likely occur in only a small minority of cases. Moreover, arbitrators as a body
do have something to add to the legal system in analysing the way statutes
should impinge on the collective bargaining process. Only if they actively
exercise this jurisdiction will the benefits of their views be available to the
reviewing courts who must make the final judgments. The alternative, of course,
is to require all, or almost all, cases to be relitigated in terms of the statutory
issue, and this time in front of a court which does not have the assistance of an
independent examination of this problem in the forum where the rest of the
matter has already been adjudicated.
We are left then with a conflict between two competing values, institutional
competence and institutional economy. For reasons given earlier, I believe the
former is of lesser weight in more situations than the latter, and I would support
a jurisdiction in arbitration to apply statutory rules even where they are in
conflict with contract terms. I would have to be a poor practical lawyer, though,
if I were to predict that our higher courts will reach this same conclusion, at
least in the near immediate future. My main concern, or at least hope, with
respect to the courts is that they not deprive the arbitrators of statutory
materials as an aid in interpretation, at the same time as they deny us the right
to follow the law of the statute when it contradicts the law of the contract.
A more adequate answer to the situation will have to come from the legislature
and the statutory draftsmen who have created the problem and must accept
responsibility for solving it. Moreover, unlike the courts, the legislature can
make the decision for every statute as it assesses the weight of the two competing
values in the individual case, rather than as a matter of general principle. 31
My final comments in this paper, then, are directed to the legislative
draftsman. I suggest that there are three separate issues for the law-maker in
this area which, unfortunately, do not seem to have been fully sorted out. There
is, first of all, the question whether a statute should be made to over-ride the
31 The real problem in this area has been the almost total failure of our statutory
draftsmen to address this problem, one way or the other. Only in Section 10(3) of The
Health Services Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1970 c. 200, is there explicit provision for arbitration
of statutory amendments of collective agreements, and this may have served only to make
more conspicuous the omission in Section 10(2). It is quite customary in The Employment
Standards Act, R.S.O. 1970 c. 147, and other such legislation to make the Act applicable
notwithstanding agreement to the contrary (see Section 3 of the Act), and to leave the
matter at that. My private conversations with some officials responsible for administering
this legislation indicate that they believe that such a mandatory provision itself provides
the base for the arbitrator's jurisdiction and, indeed, these officials then encourage the
channelling of the disputes under the Act to the grievance procedure and arbitration if it is
available. The discussion in this paper and seminar should serve at least to dispel the illusion
that the problem is that simple.
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terms of a collective agreement, as opposed to an ordinary contract of employ-
ment. Where the purpose of the statute is to protect the interests of the
employees generally, the legislature should not lightly conclude that collective
bargaining is not a preferable vehicle for this purpose, without the distorting
impact of a generalized statutory rule. For example, I can think of good reasons
why the Employment Standards Act and women's rights legislation might
be distinguished in this regard. However, assuming that the legislature wants
the statute to be applied irrespective of a collective agreement, the next decision
it must make is whether it wants the individual employee to have the immediate
remedy of the new rights created by the statute, even though his union has
agreed to trade them away in negotiations. The alternative is to use the statute
as a weapon by which the government agency may force the parties who are
mutually responsible for the illegal agreement to agree, mutually, to alter it
with concessions from either side. Again, though, assuming the legislature
wants immediate, restrospective remedies for the individual, the next question
is whether the procedure or forum for obtaining this remedy, and accommo-
dating the agreement and the statute, should be arbitration, or a court, or a
specialized tribunal. For the reasons I have given, I believe that arbitration
should be available as a primary source of relief, with subsequent review in
court for errors of law, and with administrative remedies available under the
statute as an alternative. Section 37 of the Labour Relations Act should be
amended to provide that where a statute is intended (1) to over-ride a collective
agreement and (2) to afford immediate employment rights to the employee,
the ordinary grievance arbitration procedures under the collective agreement
should be an avenue for obtaining this relief.
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